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Monetary Policy 
Transmission to Residential 
Investment
Introduction
he volatility of residential investment has declined 
considerably since the mid-1980s (Chart 1). The timing of 
this reduction in volatility corresponds to the timing of a 
fundamental restructuring of the housing finance system, from 
a heavily regulated system dominated by thrift institutions 
(savings and loans and mutual savings banks) to a relatively 
unregulated system dominated by mortgage bankers and 
brokers and the process of mortgage securitization. With this 
restructuring, the housing finance system is now integrated 
with the broader capital markets in the sense that “mortgage 
rates move in response to changes in other capital market rates, 
and mortgage funds are readily available at going market rates” 
(Hendershott and Van Order 1989).
In light of this restructuring, it is certainly possible that the 
transmission of monetary policy to residential investment has 
changed. The supply of mortgage credit is now less likely to 
experience the sharp swings that occurred in the 1960s and 
1970s. This, along with much greater competitiveness in the 
primary mortgage market prompted by deregulation, suggests 
that a tightening of monetary policy is less likely to result in 
nonprice rationing of mortgage credit, as was frequently the 
case under the old system. Our goal in this paper is to 
document any differences between the effects of changes in 
monetary policy on residential investment under the current 
and previous housing finance regimes.
In the first half of the paper, we review the significant 
changes in the housing finance system over the past thirty years 
and discuss the implications of these changes for the cost and 
availability of mortgage credit. In the second half, we present a 
two-part econometric analysis of the transmission of changes 
in monetary policy to residential investment. The first part uses 
a small, reduced-form macroeconomic model to examine the 
response of the housing market to a monetary policy “shock.” 
We then use a structural model of investment in single-family 
housing to examine the effect that the changes in the housing 
finance system have had on the housing market and on the 
response of that market to changes in monetary policy. Our 
main conclusion is that the eventual magnitude of the response 
of residential investment to a given change in monetary policy 
is similar to what it has been in the past. However, that 
response does not occur as quickly as it did under the old 
housing finance system and its timing is now similar to that of 
the overall economy.
Evolution of the Housing
Finance System
The housing finance system can be thought of as three 
interrelated but distinct markets: the primary mortgage 
market, the secondary mortgage market, and the market for 
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Chart 1
Residential Investment: Single-Family Structures
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mortgage-backed securities (MBSs). Over the past thirty years, 
the underlying institutional setting of those markets has changed 
dramatically in response to macroeconomic conditions, 
deregulation, and financial and technological innovation. This 
section reviews those changes and discusses their implications 
for the cost and availability of mortgage credit.
Trends in the Primary Mortgage Market
The primary mortgage market is where homeowners 
(mortgagors) borrow from mortgage lenders (originators), 
pledging their home as collateral for the debt. The debt 
instrument created in this transaction is typically referred to 
as a whole loan. Thirty years ago, the primary market was 
dominated by the heavily regulated thrift industry. Today, it 
is dominated by the relatively unregulated mortgage 
banking industry.
As recently as the 1970s, the primary mortgage market had 
essentially the same structure as the one created during the 
1930s, often referred to as the New Deal system.1 Under that 
system, thrifts gathered primarily local time deposits and 
made long-term fixed-rate mortgage loans on residential 
properties located near their home offices,2 which were then 
held in the thrift’s portfolio. To enable thrifts to attract more 
easily the funds needed for mortgage lending, Regulation Q, 
which established maximum interest rates on deposits, gave 
thrifts a ceiling 25 basis points higher than the one for 
commercial banks. Although thrifts were subject to 
restrictions on the assets they could acquire—no corporate 
loans, bonds, or equities—they benefited from a unique tax 
provision that made it very profitable for them to invest in 
residential mortgages.3
This system was established for a variety of motives, 
including the promotion of home ownership and stable 
economic growth. It was also dictated to a large extent by the 
nature of the mortgage asset. Mortgages are promises to pay 
made by individuals, with their properties serving as collateral. 
Assessment of credit risk requires substantial knowledge of 
local market conditions, making individual mortgages 
relatively illiquid.
The New Deal housing finance system worked quite well in 
the relatively low-inflation environment of the 1950s and early 
1960s. However, by the late 1960s, as inflation began to 
increase, the weaknesses of this system became evident. Thrifts 
funded their portfolios of primarily long-term mortgage assets 
with primarily short-term savings deposits. As interest rates 
increased, thrifts’ cost of funds rose quickly while the rate of 
return on their portfolio of mortgages rose very slowly, sharply 
reducing their net income. Moreover, as short-term interest 
rates rose above the Regulation Q ceilings, those short-term 
deposits often flowed out of thrifts and commercial banks to 
higher yielding alternatives, such as the newly emerging money 
market mutual funds. As a consequence, these institutions 
were forced to contract the flow of mortgage credit sharply, 
leading to steep contractions of residential construction and 
sales of existing homes. In addition to this interest rate risk, the 
geographic limits placed on thrifts exposed them to substantial 
credit risk during regional downturns. Finally, as thrifts went 
from profitability to losses, the value of their loan loss tax 
provision fell to zero.4
The declining earnings of thrifts and these episodes of 
disintermediation led to two major policy thrusts. One was to 
expand thrifts’ asset and liability powers to bolster their 
earnings and preserve them as lending institutions with a focus 
on housing finance.5 The second was to foster the development 
of a market for mortgage-backed securities to enhance thrifts’ 
liquidity and broaden the investor base for home mortgages, 
which we discuss in the next section. At the time, these efforts 
may have been viewed as complementary. With hindsight, 
however, it is clear that the rapid growth of the market for 
mortgage-backed securities contributed greatly to the loss of 
thrifts’ cost advantages and thus to their declining importance 
in housing finance.
Indeed, in the 1970s, thrifts originated 55 percent of long-
term mortgages on one-to-four-family properties (Chart 2). At 
that time, mortgage companies or bankers tended to specialize 
in loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2002 141
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and loans guaranteed by the Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA). This specialization limited their primary market share to 
just 19 percent. Unlike thrifts, mortgage bankers are not 
depository institutions. They fund mortgages through assorted 
forms of short-term borrowing—sometimes referred to as a 
warehouse line of credit—and then sell the loans for cash or 
“swap” them for mortgage-backed securities in the secondary 
mortgage market.6 By the mid-1990s, mortgage bankers and 
thrifts had switched roles, with mortgage bankers originating 
63 percent of loans closed over 1995-96 and thrifts originating 
just 19 percent.7 The rise of mortgage banking in the primary 
market was largely dependent upon changes in the secondary 
mortgage market and the development of the market for MBSs.
Trends in the Secondary Mortgage Market
The secondary mortgage market involves the sale and purchase 
of whole loans originated in the primary market. Here, as in the 
primary market, the role of thrift institutions has changed 
markedly over the past thirty years. In the 1970s, thrifts’ net 
acquisitions of mortgages exceeded their originations, indicating 
that thrifts were net purchasers of mortgages in the secondary 
market.8 However, after 1980, thrifts became net sellers of 
mortgages, like commercial banks and mortgage bankers.
The counterpart to thrifts becoming net sellers of mortgages 
as well as the increasing market share of mortgage bankers in 
the primary market has been the growth of the government-
sponsored mortgage pools and, more recently, private conduits 
as net acquirers of mortgages in the secondary market. These 
acquisitions then serve as the collateral for mortgage-backed 
securities, which entitle the holder to a portion of the cash flow 
generated by a pool of mortgage loans. The government-
sponsored mortgage pools are the Government National 
Mortgage Association (GNMA, or Ginnie Mae), the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (FNMA, or Fannie Mae), and 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC, or 
Freddie Mac).9 In addition to issuing MBSs, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, which are government-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs) or federal credit agencies, have issued debt and acquired 
substantial portfolios of mortgage loans (and MBSs).10
Chart 3 presents the net acquisitions of the government-
sponsored mortgage pools, the federal credit agencies, and 
private conduits as shares of total single-family loan 
originations from 1970 to the late 1990s. In the early 1970s, the 
government-sponsored pools acquired just 5 percent of total 
originations. In the 1990s, their purchases averaged around 
50 percent of total originations.11 Private conduits did not 
exist in the early 1980s, but by the late 1990s they were 
acquiring 5 percent of total originations. Also by the late 1990s, 
the federal credit agencies were purchasing 10 to 15 percent of 
the flow of originations to hold in their portfolios. Collectively, 
the government-sponsored pools, the federal credit agencies, 
and the private conduits were net purchasers of about two-
thirds of single-family originations during the late 1990s.
This tremendous growth is a testament to the advantages 
provided by mortgage securitization, a process that began in 142 Monetary Policy Transmission to Residential Investment
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earnest when Ginnie Mae issued the first mortgage pass-through 
security in 1970 and Freddie Mac began issuing mortgage 
participation certificates backed by conventional mortgage loans 
in 1971.12 Mortgage securitization is a way of overcoming the 
inherent illiquidity of whole mortgage loans. By pooling 
individual mortgages, it is possible to diversify credit risk over a 
large number of geographically dispersed borrowers and 
properties. With diversification, credit risk could be more easily 
evaluated, allowing the security issuer to add credit 
enhancement. For example, Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and 
Freddie Mac mortgage-backed securities guarantee payment of 
interest and principal, freeing the investor from credit risk, 
although the investor is still subject to prepayment risk.13
In addition to the diversification benefits derived from 
pooling mortgages, several other key factors spurred the 
growth of securitization. Because of the advantages conferred 
by their GSE status, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac gained a 
significant cost advantage over thrifts.14 The GSE advantages 
include the market perception of a Treasury guarantee of the 
securities and debt that the agencies issue; the “qualified 
investment” status of the agencies’ debt for regulated financial 
institutions; and exemption from state and local taxes, 
Securities and Exchange Commission registration fees and 
requirements, and many state securities laws. In addition, 
FIRREA lowered thrifts’ capital requirements for mortgage-
backed securities relative to whole loans, increasing their 
incentive to hold MBSs. Finally, new financial products further 
enlarged the investor pool for MBSs. For example, in 1983, 
Freddie Mac issued the first collateralized mortgage obligation 
(CMO), which divides the cash flow of a pool of mortgages into 
various maturity tranches, simultaneously creating short-term 
securities backed by mortgages and addressing the prepayment 
risk faced by investors in traditional MBSs.15 
Some private firms—private conduits—have begun 
securitizing mortgages, but they are limited primarily to 
nonconforming conventional loans.16 Private securitizers 
currently cannot compete with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 
the conforming loan market because they must maintain more 
capital, their securitization costs are higher, and they do not 
have the economies of scale already realized by the GSEs.
Trends in Holdings of Mortgage Debt
Corresponding to the changes in the primary and secondary 
mortgage markets, the past thirty years have also witnessed 
dramatic changes in holdings of home mortgage debt. Chart 4 
presents data on holdings of whole mortgage loans combined 
with our estimates of holdings of mortgage-backed securities.17 
Since 1980, thrifts’ holdings of whole loans and MBSs have 
declined from more than 50 percent of the stock of home 
mortgage debt to around 13 percent by early 2000. In contrast, 
the share of home mortgage debt held by the federally related 
mortgage pools has risen from essentially zero in 1970 to
10 percent in 1980, to 36 percent in 1990, and to 46 percent by 
2000. The holdings of the GSEs and the private asset-backed-
securities issuers have also risen rapidly, particularly in the 1990s. 
Implications for the Cost and Availability
of Mortgage Credit
With the development of the modern housing finance system, 
the primary mortgage market has become fully integrated with 
the capital markets. Consequently, the supply of mortgage 
credit is no longer subject to sharp swings in availability related 
to the fortunes of thrifts in securing deposits. Rather, mortgage 
credit is generally available at the going interest rate. This 
change is evident when comparing the growth of single-family 
residential investment with the rate of growth of thrift deposits. 
As seen in Chart 1, through the mid-1980s, periods of deposit 
outflows were associated with sharp declines in residential 
investment. After the mid-1980s, that relationship no longer 
existed. Also confirming the declining influence of thrift 
deposit flows, Bradley, Gabriel, and Wohar (1995) find that 
over the 1972-82 period, thrift provision of mortgage credit 
had a significant influence on the spread between mortgage 
interest rates and yields on comparable-maturity Treasuries. 
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find that the influence of thrifts on that spread declined and 
effectively vanished by the late 1980s.
The effect of the evolution of the housing finance system on 
the pricing of mortgage credit is not as clear. Several studies 
have concluded that the interest rates on conforming 
conventional mortgage loans are significantly less than those 
on nonconforming or “jumbo” conventional loans, and they 
attribute those lower rates to the cost advantages of Fannie 
Mae. For example, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
recently concluded that over the 1995-2000 period, rates on 
conforming fixed-rate loans were on average 18 to 25 basis 
points below those on jumbo fixed-rate loans (Congressional 
Budget Office 2001). However, the CBO noted that this 
conclusion assumes that borrowers in the conforming and 
jumbo markets have similar risk characteristics, which may not 
be the case. Research suggests that prepayment and default risk 
may be higher for jumbo borrowers, and that the prices of 
more expensive homes tend to be more volatile than the prices 
of more moderately priced homes.
From a longer term perspective, it does not appear that 
mortgage interest rates are now significantly lower than they 
were when the New Deal housing finance system was in 
reasonably healthy operation. For example, the spread between 
the contract rate on thirty-year fixed-rate mortgages and Aaa-
rated corporate bonds in the 1990s was comparable to that of 
the 1970s, even though that spread widened substantially 
during the early 1980s as the old system began to deteriorate 
while the new system had not fully developed (Chart 5). 
Indeed, Hendershott and Van Order (1989) find that because 
of the aforementioned thrift tax advantages and portfolio 
restrictions, mortgage rates in the 1970s were on average 
50 basis points below what they would have been in a “perfect” 
capital market. In the early 1980s, mortgage rates rose above 
the perfect capital market rate because of the reduced 
profitability of thrifts, which reduced the value of their tax 
advantage, and expanded thrift asset powers. By the late 1980s, 
actual mortgage rates and these estimated perfect market rates 
were essentially the same, suggesting that the mortgage market 
had become fully integrated into the broader capital markets.
The evolution of the housing finance system has had 
additional effects on the cost and availability of mortgage credit 
that appear to have some impact on the behavior of residential 
investment. For instance, the initial fees and charges associated 
with obtaining a mortgage have declined from around 
2½ percent of the loan amount in the early 1980s to just over 
½ percent recently. Research suggests that the decline in these 
transaction costs has increased the propensity of homeowners 
to refinance their mortgages.18 This in turn suggests that 
increases in interest rates may present less of a restraint on 
home sales, provided that prospective homebuyers regard the 
increase in rates as temporary. The widespread availability of 
adjustable-rate mortgages likely has had a similar effect. In 
addition to allowing consumers to select a loan maturity (a 
place on the yield curve) that corresponds to their expectations 
of the life of their mortgage, ARMs appear to soften the blow of 
increases in long-term rates on the level of housing market 
activity, at least in the initial stages of those increases.
Housing within a Monetary
Policy VAR Model
We now turn to the issue of whether these changes to the 
housing finance system have altered the magnitude and/or 
timing of the impact of monetary policy on the housing sector. 
To analyze this issue, we first estimate the response of 
residential investment to monetary policy changes within a 
vector autoregression (VAR) model similar to one used by 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995).19 Our VAR consists of two lags of 
the logarithms of real GDP, the GDP deflator, commodity 
prices, residential investment in single-unit structures, and 
single-family home prices relative to the GDP deflator, as well 
as the levels of the federal funds rate and mortgage rates.20
Because the transition from the New Deal system to the 
current system was largely completed by the mid-1980s, we 
arbitrarily split the sample in 1986:1 and estimate the model 
over two periods: 1975:1-1985:4 and 1986:1-2000:3.21 The 144 Monetary Policy Transmission to Residential Investment
Residential Investment
Chart 6
Impulse Responses to a Fed Funds Shock









































effects of monetary policy in this model for each period are 
then measured by the impulse responses to a 50-basis-point 
“shock” in the federal funds rate.22 To identify the shocks, we 
follow standard practice and use a Choleski decomposition 
with the variables in the order described above.23
Under the New Deal system, the response of residential 
investment to a monetary policy shock is quite sharp (Chart 6). 
Residential investment responds quickly after an increase in the 
fed funds rate, declining by 3 percent after two quarters. Over 
the same horizon, GDP declines by about 0.3 percent. 
Residential investment then recovers quickly, returning to its 
baseline after one and a half years (it takes GDP about two years 
to do so).
In contrast, residential investment responds more slowly 
after the mid-1980s. Two quarters after the shock, residential 
investment has hardly changed. It now takes two years—longer 
than the time it took for residential investment to return to its 
baseline in the earlier period—for residential investment to 
reach its maximum decline.24 Nonetheless, this maximum 
decline is greater than that of the earlier period, probably 
because the fed funds rate increase is more persistent and 
mortgage rates respond more in the later period (Chart 6).
Chart 6 also shows that there are noticeable differences 
between the responses of home prices and mortgage rates in the 
two periods. Although there is initially little response, home 
prices eventually respond more during the later period than 
during the earlier one.25 In regard to mortgage rates, the initial 
response is larger in the later period, which is consistent with 
the greater integration between the mortgage market and the 
capital markets. The response over longer horizons is also 
larger in the later period. This reflects the greater persistence of 
the fed funds rate during this period.26
These responses indicate that the transmission of 
monetary policy to housing has changed. In the earlier 
period, residential investment responds quickly to monetary 
policy even though home prices and mortgage rates respond 
little. This pattern suggests that monetary policy affected 
housing primarily by rationing the quantity of mortgage 
credit and choking off demand. We find this even though our 
sample excludes earlier episodes of disintermediation found 
to have a large effect on housing.27
In the later period, the responses suggest that monetary 
policy affects housing through the pricing of mortgage credit 
and homes. The response of mortgage rates is greater initially 
and is more persistent. Home prices eventually respond more 
than they did in the earlier period. With monetary policy 
transmitted through these pricing channels, residential 
investment responds more slowly, but eventually strongly. 
Therefore, monetary policy still appears to have a strong effect 
on residential investment, but it takes longer for it to occur.
To offer a better understanding of how and why the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism to the housing 
sector has changed, we examine the behavior of the sector 
more closely, using a structural model.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2002 145
A Model of the Housing Sector
Underlying our structural model of the housing sector is the 
stock-flow model that has long been popular in the housing 
literature.28 Our model also takes into account the fact that the 
housing market responds gradually to monetary policy.
First, we describe the long-run equilibrium portion of our 
model. On the demand side, given the stock of housing  ,29 
the long-run demand function determines the price  that 
would clear the current stock of housing.30 The position of this 
demand function in turn depends upon the permanent income 
of households, which we proxy using nondurables and services 
consumption   and the user cost   of holding the housing 
asset.31 This relationship (with all variables in logarithms) can 
then be expressed as:
(1) .
Because equation 1 is a demand curve, the coefficients on 
housing and user cost are expected to be negative, while that on 
consumption is expected to be positive.
On the supply side, we assume that entry and exit ensure 
that home construction firms make zero profits in the long run. 
Therefore, given the cost structure of construction firms, the 
home price   induces a sufficiently high investment rate 
 to cover depreciation and expected housing stock 
growth ( , where   is the depreciation rate). 
This relationship can be expressed as:
(2) .
In equation 2,   is log residential investment (and so 
is the log investment rate) and   is a construction cost 
index for single-family homes. Because this is a supply 
relationship, the coefficients on each of the variables should be 
positive.
If the housing market adjusted to shocks instantaneously, 
then we could close the model by assuming the equilibrium 
condition   and estimate only equations 1 and 
2. However, there is overwhelming evidence that both home 
prices and residential investment adjust slowly to shocks.32 We 
account for slow adjustment by incorporating an error-
correction process in both the demand and supply sides of the 
model. Specifically, if the model was in equilibrium and a shock 
occurred, wedges develop between the current price and   as 
well as  . A fraction of each of these wedges is closed in a 
period, so that they slowly dissipate if no other shocks occur.
According to these assumptions, a positive difference 
between the actual price level and   in the previous period, 
which indicates excess supply, reduces home price inflation. 
Beyond this effect, shocks to consumption and user costs lead 
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The financial wealth of households may affect homebuyers’ 
ability to meet down-payment and collateral constraints for 
obtaining mortgages; thus, wealth   may affect short-run 
demand. Finally, tenant rent inflation   may affect housing 
demand because renting is a substitute for owner occupancy.33 
Therefore, the short-run demand equation we estimate is
(3)
.
In equation 3,   is the first difference of a variable. The 
coefficients on   and user cost are expected to be 
negative, while those on consumption growth, wealth growth, 
and tenant rent inflation are expected to be positive.34
According to our assumptions concerning the supply side, a 
positive difference between actual home price and   in the 
previous period, which indicates a good environment for home 
building, increases investment. Beyond this, higher 
construction costs should reduce investment, while Mayer and 
Somerville (2000) find that home price inflation affects 
investment positively. Rising land prices may indicate 
constraints on available lots for building, and thus may be 
negatively related to investment. Finally, many studies have 
shown that a variable reflecting the quantity of homes on the 
market affects residential investment.35 Therefore, our short-
run supply equation is
(4)
.
In equation 4,   is the investment rate for single-unit 
residential structures: investment divided by the stock at the 
end of the previous period. The variable   is a short-term 
interest rate using the rate on three-month certificates of 
deposit and PCE (personal consumption expenditures) 
deflator inflation;   is land price relative to the PCE deflator, 
where land price is proxied by the deflator on rental value of farm 
dwellings;   is the quantity variable, the logarithm of the 
month’s supply (at current selling rates) of new homes for sale as 
of the end of the previous period. We expect the coefficients on 
home price inflation and   to be positive and the 
coefficients on the other variables to be negative.
Estimation Results
To preview our empirical results, we find that most of the 
demand and supply factors in our model have statistically and 
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only. These results thus suggest that monetary policy is now 
transmitted to housing through pricing channels, rather than 
through quantitative financing restrictions, as was typical 
during the New Deal financing system era.
Long-Run Demand and Supply
Equations 1 and 2 imply that the following six variables should 
be cointegrated with two cointegrating vectors: home price, 
housing stock, consumption, user cost, residential investment, 
and construction cost. Using the Johansen trace statistic, we 
find that there indeed are two cointegrating vectors, as pre-
dicted by the model (Table 1, panel A).36 We then estimate the 
two cointegrating vectors imposing the restrictions implicit in 
equations 1 and 2 (Table 1, panel B). These restrictions are
1) the coefficients on residential investment and construction 
costs are zero in equation 1,  2) the coefficients on consump-
tion and user cost are zero in equation 2, and 3) the coefficient 
on the housing stock in equation 2 is the negative of that on 
residential investment.
We do not reject these restrictions, and the coefficient 
estimates also appear to be reasonable. The coefficients all 
have the correct sign, have reasonable magnitudes, and are 
statistically significant with the exception of user cost. In 
particular, the coefficient on consumption is greater than 1, 
indicating a high long-run income elasticity consistent with 
common conceptions about housing demand. The two error 
terms (not provided) are consistent with commonly held 
views on the behavior of the housing market and home 
prices. The error term from the long-run demand equation 
Table 1
Estimates and Tests of Long-Run Relationships
Equations 1 and 2
Panel A: Johansen Cointegration Test Statistic
Number of









Panel B: Estimates of Two Cointegrating Vectors
Demand (Equation1) Supply (Equation 2)
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Housing stock -4.197 0.985 -2.864 0.379
Consumption 3.431 0.716 ——
User cost -0.029 0.024 ——
Investment —— 2.864 0.379
Construction cost —— 4.545 0.553
Memo:
Test of overidentifying restrictions
Chi-square (3) = 2.38 p-value = 0.50
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: There are four lags in the vector autoregression. The estimation period is 1975:1 to 2000:3. In panel B, the dependent variable is log home price.
aSignificance levels are from Osterwald-Lenum (1992).FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2002 147
indicates that prices rise above demand “fundamentals” just 
before recessions, while the term from the long-run supply 
equation indicates that the investment rate is “too high” 
relative to fundamentals before recessions.
Changes in Short-Run Price Adjustment
Turning to the short-run price adjustment equation—
equation 3—we see that the coefficient estimates are consistent 
with our predictions when the equation is estimated over the 
entire sample (Table 2, regression 1).37 The coefficient on 
consumption growth is about two-thirds, indicating a short-
run elasticity smaller than the long-run elasticity. Although the 
Table 2
Short-Run Demand Equation











Error-correction term (-1) -0.049 0.024 -0.050 0.024
Consumption growth 0.655 0.210 0.710 0.216
User cost difference -0.005 0.005 -0.004 0.005
Wealth growth 0.035 0.021 0.029 0.022
Tenant rent inflation 0.403 0.259 0.336 0.255
Loan-price ratio difference -0.0025 0.0007
1975:1-1985:4 coefficients
Error-correction term (-1) -0.054 0.025 -0.054 0.026
Consumption growth 0.440 0.346 0.488 0.361
User cost difference -0.001 0.006 0.001 0.006
Wealth growth 0.046 0.066 0.054 0.067
Tenant rent inflation 0.058 0.406 0.026 0.399
Loan-price ratio difference -0.0016 0.0013
1986:1-2000:3 coefficients
Error-correction term (-1) -0.077 0.026 -0.081 0.023
Consumption growth 0.832 0.207 0.855 0.235
User cost difference -0.027 0.014 -0.032 0.012
Wealth growth 0.025 0.020 0.011 0.018
Tenant rent inflation 0.792 0.165 0.603 0.153
Loan-price ratio difference -0.0031 0.0006
Adjusted R2 0.308 0.350 0.342 0.376
Memo:
Test for break in 1986:1a Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
36.775 0.000 41.748 0.000
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The dependent variable is home price inflation. The estimation period is 1975:1 to 2000:3. All regressions include a constant (not reported), which is 
allowed to change in regressions 2 and 4. The estimation is performed using ordinary least squares with Newey-West standard errors (allowing for up to a 
fourth order moving average process).
a The test statistic is distributed chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of independent variables (six in regression 2 and seven in
regression 4).148 Monetary Policy Transmission to Residential Investment
coefficient on user cost is negative, it is statistically 
insignificant. The coefficient on the error-correction term is 
about -0.05, indicating that only about 18 percent of the 
difference between actual and equilibrium prices is closed 
within a year. This may seem slow, but it is roughly consistent 
with the adjustment rates found by other researchers.38
As we are interested in the possibility of a shift in short-run 
demand in the post–New Deal system period, we reestimate 
equation 3 allowing for a possible structural break in 1986. 
Estimating this expanded model, we find that the test statistic 
soundly rejects the null hypothesis of no structural break 
(Table 2, regression 2).
Moreover, the coefficient estimates are consistent with a shift 
from a quantity-rationed market to a price-rationed one. Prior 
to the mid-1980s, the coefficient estimates are insignificant with 
the exception of the one on the error-correction term. In 
particular, home prices are unresponsive to user costs (and thus 
interest rates) and the price of the closest substitute, rental 
housing, suggesting a quantity-rationed market.
Since the mid-1980s, home prices are responsive to most of 
the demand factors. The coefficients on consumption, user 
cost, and rent inflation are significant and have considerably 
larger magnitudes. The coefficient on the error-correction 
term suggests a somewhat higher adjustment rate of about 
27 percent per year. All of this is consistent with a market 
where prices are the primary rationing mechanism.
This shift suggests that monetary policy now works mostly 
through the price mechanism, resulting in a more delayed 
response of demand to monetary policy changes. With user 
costs a greater influence on demand and with interest rates an 
important factor in housing user costs, monetary policy 
eventually should have a strong influence on demand. 
Nevertheless, user costs are a complicated function of interest 
rates, expected home price inflation, and depreciation; thus, 
the effect of monetary policy is probably quite complicated and 
slow, much like in the case of business investment.39 Because 
price adjustment toward equilibrium remains slow, housing 
demand should decline more slowly in response to a monetary 
policy tightening than it did under the New Deal housing 
finance system.
Loan-Price Ratio and Housing Demand
We wish to consider one other possible demand determinant 
with implications for monetary transmission to housing: the 
average loan-price ratio for mortgages. Because observed loan-
price ratios reflect both demand and supply in the mortgage 
market, their relationship with home price inflation is not 
clear-cut. For lenders, higher down-payment (lower loan-price 
ratio) mortgages are desirable because they mitigate the 
informational problems inherent in lending. For borrowers, a 
higher loan-price ratio eases down-payment constraints, which 
should increase demand. However, most homebuyers use the 
net proceeds from the sale of their previous home as the down 
payment on their new mortgage. Therefore, periods of rapid 
home price appreciation may be associated with lower loan-
price ratios because more loans are made to borrowers able to 
make larger down payments. Which effect dominates then 
becomes an empirical matter.
Including the loan-price ratio in the price adjustment 
equation, we see that the latter effect appears to dominate. 
Estimating over the entire sample, we see that the coefficient on 
the ratio is negative, suggesting that down payments are greater 
during periods of strong demand (Table 2, regression 3). More 
importantly, when we allow for a break in 1986:1, the 
coefficient is twice as large after the break than before. In the 
later period, a one-percentage-point rise in the loan-price ratio 
is associated with a 31-basis-point decrease in home price 
inflation, which is about one-third of its standard deviation 
(Table 2, regression 4). This result thus reinforces our 
conclusion that pricing has become the principal rationing 
mechanism in the housing market, which in turn has affected 
the transmission of monetary policy to housing in a manner 
consistent with our VAR analysis.
Changes in Short-Run Supply Adjustment
On the supply side of our model, estimates of equation 4 over 
the entire sample indicate that few supply factors have a 
significant effect on the residential investment rate, primarily 
because the estimates are imprecise (Table 3, regression 1).40 
The coefficients on the error-correction term and the month’s 
supply variable have the expected signs and are statistically 
significant. However, home price inflation has little effect on 
the investment rate, and the coefficient on the interest rate, 
although negative as expected, is not statistically significant.
Again, because we are interested in a possible shift in short-
run supply during the 1980s, we reestimate equation 4 allowing 
the coefficients to change beginning in 1986:1. The statistical 
tests of a structural break strongly reject the hypothesis of no 
structural break in favor of some coefficients changing between 
the two periods (Table 3, regression 2).
Beyond this statistical test, the pattern of the coefficients is 
consistent with a shift from a quantity-rationed market to a 
price-rationed one. Prior to the mid-1980s, the coefficient on 
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Table 3
Residential Investment Regressions











Error-correction term (-1) 0.240 0.064 0.218 0.065
Home price inflation -0.006 0.106 0.094 0.061
Construction cost inflation 0.176 0.140 0.011 0.106
Real interest rate -0.018 0.012 -0.030 0.007
Land price inflation -0.138 0.076 -0.041 0.073
Month’s supply (-1) -0.006 0.003 -0.003 0.001
Net deposit flow 0.003 0.006
1975:1-1985:4 coefficients
Error-correction term (-1) 0.219 0.048 0.226 0.081
Home price inflation -0.050 0.078 0.062 0.047
Construction cost inflation 0.012 0.073 -0.058 0.095
Real interest rate -0.018 0.004 -0.026 0.006
Land price inflation 0.157 0.073 0.044 0.044
Month’s supply (-1) -0.012 0.002 -0.010 0.001
Net deposit flow 0.005 0.011
1986:1-2000:3 coefficients
Error-correction term (-1) 0.120 0.034 0.128 0.029
Home price inflation 0.097 0.026 0.103 0.026
Construction cost inflation -0.006 0.031 0.011 0.028
Real interest rate -0.027 0.008 -0.027 0.009
Land price inflation -0.004 0.031 -0.009 0.033
Month’s supply (-1) -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001
Net deposit flow -0.001 0.003
Standard error of regression 0.0021 0.0015 0.0015 0.0011
J-statistica 2.612 6.381 4.657 6.978
p-value 0.625 0.496 0.324 0.431
Memo:
Test for break in 1986:1b Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
74.504 0.000 123.690 0.000
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the investment-capital ratio for single-unit residential structures. The estimation period is 1975:1 to 2000:3. 
All regressions include a constant (not reported). The estimation is performed using generalized method-of-moments. The instruments include a constant, 
the lagged error-correction term, the lagged month’s supply variable, the real interest rate, consumption growth, user cost difference, tenant rent inflation, 
manufacturing wage growth, manufacturing materials price inflation, the marginal personal income tax rate, and the average property tax rate.
aThe statistic is distributed chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments minus the number of regressors (four in regressions
1 and 3 and seven in regressions 2 and 4).
bThe test statistic is distributed chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of independent variables (seven in regression 2 and eight in
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quantity constraints, is very statistically significant and much 
larger than the full-sample coefficient. The coefficient on the 
interest rate is more precisely estimated so that it is also 
statistically significant, although it is similar to its estimate over 
the entire sample. The coefficients on the other variables are 
roughly the same as they were over the entire sample.
After the mid-1980s, the coefficients change markedly. Most 
notably, the coefficient on month’s supply becomes essentially 
zero, suggesting that nonprice factors have become less 
important for residential investment. Home price inflation has 
the expected positive effect on residential investment, 
suggesting that prices have become important in determining 
residential investment. The coefficient on the error-correction 
term becomes smaller, but remains statistically significant. The 
significantly negative coefficient on the real interest rate has 
become somewhat larger.
As with demand, this shift in the supply adjustment 
equation suggests that monetary policy affects housing 
mostly through the price mechanism. As a consequence, we 
would expect residential investment to respond more slowly 
to monetary policy. Our estimates of the price adjustment 
equation indicate that home prices adjust slowly to shocks, 
which will tend to result in a slow response of residential 
investment to a monetary policy tightening. Nevertheless, 
because the direct effect of interest rates on supply has 
changed little, the eventual response of residential 
investment to a monetary tightening should be similar to 
that in the 1970s and early 1980s, consistent with the VAR 
impulse responses.
Do Deposit Flows Affect Supply?
Another feature of the New Deal housing finance system was 
thrifts’ financing of many homebuilders, in part because 
some thrifts were controlled by homebuilders. Therefore, 
thrift deposit inflows may have led to more home 
construction, at least before the mid-1980s. To investigate 
this possibility, we added to equation 4 a net deposit inflow 
variable: deposit inflows into savings institutions as a 
fraction of deposits at the beginning of the quarter, from the 
Flow of Funds. Despite our expectations, deposit inflows had 
at best only small effects on residential investment during 
the New Deal finance system period (Table 3, regressions 3 
and 4). Even in this period, the coefficient on deposit 
inflows is statistically insignificant, and the variable has little 
effect on the coefficients on the other variables.
Conclusion
The restructuring of the housing finance system has been an 
important factor behind the behavior of housing over the past 
twenty-five years. Before the mid-1980s, the housing finance 
system was dominated by specialized, highly regulated savings 
institutions. Now, less regulated mortgage bankers and the 
mortgage securitization process are the dominant players in the 
market. Consequently, the mortgage market today is largely 
integrated into the broader capital markets, reducing the 
swings in the availability of mortgage credit.
As a result, quantitative financing constraints now have a 
smaller influence on home prices and residential investment 
than they did under the more regulated New Deal mortgage 
finance system. Instead, various aspects of the pricing of credit 
and capital costs—interest rates, user costs, and mortgage 
transaction costs—have become more important influences on 
the housing market, as pricing has become the rationing 
mechanism in mortgage credit markets.
For the transmission of monetary policy to housing, the 
restructuring of the finance system has led to significant changes. 
Under the highly regulated savings-institution-based system, 
monetary policy largely affected housing through its influence on 
the availability of credit. A tightening of monetary policy reduced 
deposit flows to savings institutions, especially when Regulation Q 
deposit-rate ceilings were binding. This caused a dramatic drop in 
credit to the housing sector and a quick and dramatic drop in 
residential investment and housing starts. Because of this fast 
response, the housing sector was an early indicator of the 
influence of tighter monetary policy on the economy.
Since the mid-1980s, tighter monetary policy has worked 
through the pricing of credit, user costs, and transaction costs, 
as well as through its effect on home prices. Because the effect 
of monetary policy on these variables is complicated, this 
transmission process takes longer to affect residential 
investment, although the ultimate effect remains quite large.
A reader may still question why less regulation and greater 
dependence on the price mechanism have led to a slower 
response to monetary policy. Although a detailed analysis is 
beyond the scope of this paper, we believe that some features of 
the housing market can explain this economically 
counterintuitive result.
One of these primary features is the fact that even though 
the mortgage market has become integrated with the capital 
markets, the market for housing units certainly is less efficient 
than the mortgage market. Homes remain illiquid and 
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households trading the homes in which they live. Although the 
original work of Case and Shiller (1989) on housing market 
efficiency used data from the New Deal housing financing 
system era, more recent work indicates that prices still adjust 
more slowly than they would in an efficient market. For 
example, Genesove and Mayer (1997, 2001) find that sellers are 
reluctant to reduce asking prices even when overall market 
conditions are weakening. These types of inefficiencies provide 
an explanation for a slow response of home prices.
With prices responding slowly, we may then expect that the 
quantity response also should be slow. Moreover, homebuilders 
now have better access to financial markets, which may make 
them less susceptible to tighter policy initially. With financing 
available (even at higher interest rates) and with the fixed costs of 
stopping and restarting projects, builders may find it less costly 
to complete current projects, even in less favorable market 
conditions, than to stop them and restart them later when 
conditions improve. We then would expect residential 
investment to respond slowly to tighter monetary policy.
In the end, housing remains a sector sensitive to monetary 
policy, as one might suspect since most home purchases have 
to be financed. Nevertheless, as the mortgage market has 
become integrated with the capital markets, the timing of the 
housing sector’s response to monetary policy has become 
similar to that of the overall economy. Those analysts looking 
for an early response by the housing sector to monetary policy 
changes in the current environment are likely to be 
disappointed.152 Monetary Policy Transmission to Residential Investment
Appendix A: Data
We discuss the sources and methods used to construct two 
variables in our analysis: the stock of single-unit residential 
structures and the user cost of residential capital.
Housing Stock
The source of our data on the stock of single-unit residential 
structures is the series published by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) and described in Herman (2000). These data 
are annual and stated as a quantity index (1996=100).
We interpolate this series using the National Income and 
Product Accounts data on residential investment in single-unit 
structures. The investment series is used to allocate the annual 
logarithmic difference between quarters so that quarters with 
higher investment are those in which the stock grows more 
quickly. This gives a quarterly stock series as a chain-weighted 
quantity index. The quantity index is then converted into a 
chain-weighted dollar series by using the 1996 current dollar 
value of the single-unit residential structures.
User Cost
To calculate the user cost of residential capital, we use the 
following standard expression:
.
The variable   is the real housing price, measured by the 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) 
home price index relative to the PCE (personal consumption 
expenditures) deflator. The variables   and   are the 
marginal federal income tax rate (for a household with twice 
the median household income) and the average state and local 
property tax rate, respectively. The source of these variables is 
the public database for the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System/U.S. macroeconomic model. The variable   is 
the depreciation rate as implied by the annual BEA stock data. 
The variable   is the expected capital gains from housing, 
proxied by the twelve-quarter moving average of the 
annualized percentage change in the OFHEO index. The 
variable   is the interest rate on three-month Treasury bills. 
This is consistent with the theory underlying the construction 
of this variable; see Poterba (1984). Nevertheless, using 
mortgage rates in place of the short-term rate (as many studies 
have done) has little effect on the results in the paper. Finally, a 
constant was added to the constructed series to ensure that 
there were no negative values of user costs.
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1938 The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) is established as a government agency to buy and sell Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) mortgages.
1968 FNMA is split into two agencies: the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) is set up within the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to take responsibility for low-income housing mortgages; 
FNMA is set up as an off-budget, federally chartered corporation that capital markets regard as having agency status.
1970 GNMA issues the first mortgage-backed pass-through securities, representing pro rata shares of pools of FHA and 
Department of Veterans Affairs mortgage loans.
1970 The Emergency Home Finance Act creates the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) to purchase 
conventional loans from savings and loans (S&Ls); FNMA is granted authority to purchase conventional mortgages.
1971 FHLMC issues the first conventional mortgage-backed security: the mortgage participation certificate.
1978 Federally chartered S&Ls in California are given the authority to write and invest in adjustable-rate mortgages, or 
ARMs. (State-chartered thrifts had already been given that authority.)
1979 Federally chartered S&Ls nationwide are granted the authority to write and invest in ARMs. (The annual and life caps 
are fairly restrictive, such as ½ to 2½.)
1980  The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act is passed.
1981 FNMA and FHLMC initiate mortgage swap programs for S&Ls; FNMA begins issuing conventional mortgage-backed 
securities.
1981 More liberal ARM authority is granted to federally chartered S&Ls and savings banks.
1982 The Garn-St. Germain Act increases deposit insurance coverage from $40,000 to $100,000. It allows use of brokered 
deposits and expanded thrift asset powers.
1982 The Deposit Institutions Act grants even more liberal ARM authority to federally chartered and state-chartered thrifts.
1983 FHLMC issues the first collateralized mortgage obligation.
1989 The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act is passed. Under the Act, capital requirements for 
thrifts are significantly increased. Also, the qualified thrift-lender test requires 70 percent of assets in qualified 
categories, up from 60 percent, and the types of nonhousing assets that qualify for this test are scaled back. In 
addition, the types and percentages of nonhousing assets in which thrifts could invest are cut back. One part of this 
Act turned FHLMC into a nearly carbon copy of FNMA, with a similar charter and the same type of board of 
directors.Endnotes
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1. See Weicher (1994) for a more thorough explanation of this system.
2. Through 1964, the homes were required to be within fifty miles 
of the home office. After 1964, the requirement was changed to 
100 miles.
3. As long as a high percentage of their assets were invested in 
“qualified housing assets,” thrifts could transfer a fraction of their 
before-tax net income to loan loss reserves, thereby avoiding taxation 
on that portion of their net income. From 1962 through 1969, that 
fraction was 60 percent; between 1969 and 1979, the fraction was 
gradually reduced to 40 percent; the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced 
it to 8 percent. Of course, thrifts had to have positive net income for 
this tax provision to have value. 
4. See Hendershott and Villani (1977).
5. To enhance thrifts’ earnings, the industry was deregulated 
considerably over the late 1970s and early 1980s. Regulation Q 
deposit-rate ceilings were relaxed beginning in 1978 and they would 
be removed substantially following the passage of the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act in 1980. 
Beginning in 1979, with subsequent liberalization in 1981 and 1982, 
federally chartered thrifts were allowed to originate and purchase 
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs). The Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 
increased deposit insurance coverage from $40,000 to $100,000, 
allowed brokered deposits, and expanded thrifts’ asset powers. 
However, as is well-known today, the expansion of thrifts into 
nonhousing assets was not a resounding success. In 1989, the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) was 
enacted to close failed thrifts and restructure what remained of the 
industry. Their nonhousing asset powers were scaled back and their 
capital requirements were increased. Along with the erosion of the tax 
preference of thrifts, these developments eliminated cost advantages 
that thrifts had in the primary market. See Hendershott (1991).
6. In most cases, the loans are sold “servicing retained,” where the 
originating mortgage banker then services the loan (collects monthly 
payments and distributes those funds, net of a servicing fee, to the 
appropriate parties). Mortgage brokers differ from mortgage bankers 
in that they typically do not have a warehouse line, so they must 
arrange for another lender to fund the mortgage.
7. Distinctions between the shares of commercial banks and mortgage 
bankers are somewhat blurred because many of the nation’s largest 
mortgage bankers are subsidiaries of bank holding companies.
8. Net acquisitions are defined as originations plus purchases minus sales.
9. Ginnie Mae securities are backed by FHA and VA loans. Unlike 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae is not the issuer of the 
security. A private lender, typically a mortgage banker, is the issuer, 
while Ginnie Mae insures the timely payment of principal and interest. 
Securitization of FHA and VA loans occurred rapidly, with the entire 
FHA/VA origination volume having been securitized by 1982.
10. More recently, many of the regional Federal Home Loan banks, 
also GSEs, have begun buying mortgages in the secondary market. 
Unlike Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan banks 
do not issue mortgage-backed securities and do not assume the credit 
risk of the mortgages they buy. Instead, these banks pay the originating 
mortgage lender to retain that credit risk. 
11. Note that the share of originations purchased by the government-
sponsored mortgage pools tends to be volatile. This is due to the fact 
that portfolio lenders such as thrifts and commercial banks prefer to 
hold adjustable-rate mortgages in their portfolios while selling fixed-
rate mortgages. Thus, whenever the ARM share of loans closed in the 
primary market increases, portfolio lenders gain market share over 
mortgage bankers, and less of the total volume of loans originated in 
the primary market is sold in the secondary market. 
12. Conventional mortgages are loans not insured or guaranteed by 
the government, although they are frequently insured by private 
mortgage insurers. Fannie Mae began issuing MBSs backed by 
conventional loans in 1981. Through the 1970s, FNMA essentially 
operated as a giant thrift institution, buying whole loans for its 
portfolio and funding them through sales of debt.
13. Because the conventional mortgages underlying Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac securities are not insured to the extent that FHA and VA 
mortgages are, the credit guarantee provided by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac adds more value to the underlying mortgage than does 
the Ginnie Mae guarantee (Hendershott 1992).
14. Hendershott and Shilling (1989) estimate that as of 1986, that cost 
advantage was 30 to 35 basis points.
15. CMOs are often referred to as resecuritizations, since the collateral 
is often MBSs. 
16. Legally, the dollar ceilings on FHA and VA loans and the 
conforming loan limit are the limits on securitization by Ginnie Mae, Endnotes (Continued)
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2002 155
Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. The conforming loan limit is the 
maximum conventional loan amount that Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac are permitted to purchase, which in 2001 was $275,000 for 
single-family homes.
17. The Flow of Funds, produced by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, provides information on the holdings of 
government agency securities, which are primarily mortgage-backed 
securities of government-related mortgage pools and the debt of 
government-sponsored enterprises. In allocating the stock of 
mortgage-backed securities, we assume that these enterprises’ 
holdings of agency securities consist solely of mortgage-backed 
securities. The remaining stock of mortgage-backed securities was 
allocated on the basis of the share of total agency securities holdings. 
18. Bennett, Peach, and Peristiani (2001) find that the decline in fees 
and other transaction costs, as well as the greater competitiveness of 
mortgage lenders, has contributed to an increased propensity to 
refinance mortgages.
19. VARs have been used by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 
(1996) to examine the effects of monetary policy and by Kahn (1989) 
and Pozdena (1990) to study the interactions between the housing 
market and monetary policy.
20. We use residential investment in single-unit structures to be 
consistent with our subsequent analysis concentrating on single-
family homes. Using total residential investment has little effect on the 
substantive results. The choice of two lags is necessitated by the short 
samples over which we estimate the model. An alternative would be to 
use a longer lag structure in a Bayesian VAR (see Kahn [1989]). The 
Bayesian VAR imposes a prior distribution on the coefficients of the 
model that reduces the number of parameters to be estimated. We 
estimated Bayesian VARs with four and five lags and found little 
substantive difference in the results from those presented here.
21. We choose 1975 as the starting date because our preferred measure 
of home prices—the repeat sales index from the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO)—begins then. If this series is 
extended by splicing the median home sales price series (which starts 
in 1968) to it, the substantive results of this exercise are similar. Using 
this longer home price series and excluding the 1979-82 Volcker 
monetary experiment period also has little effect on the substantive 
results. Furthermore, using a split date between 1984:1 and 1988:1 has 
little effect on the results. 
22. For a motivation for using the federal funds rate to identify 
monetary policy, see Bernanke and Blinder (1992).
23. With this ordering, we assume that the mortgage rate responds to 
monetary policy shocks in the same quarter. Conversely, the fed funds 
rate does not respond to shocks in mortgage rates in the same quarter. 
Although this identification is far from perfect, it is reasonable for our 
purposes, as much of the information in mortgage rates concerning 
future inflation should be captured by the other variables. Moreover, 
ordering the mortgage rate before the fed funds rate had little effect on 
the response of residential investment and home prices.
Other studies have used more complicated “structural” 
decompositions based on theoretical considerations (for example, see 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans [1999]). For our purposes, the 
conclusions from these models are not substantially different from our 
simpler model.
24. Although we do not graph the standard error bands, it is worth 
noting that the maximum decline in residential investment is 
statistically significant in both periods, suggesting that the timing 
difference is significant.
25. However, there is a “home price puzzle” in the later period, as the 
initial response is positive. This may reflect two factors. First, sellers 
may be reluctant to realize losses in a downturn, either because of 
loan-to-value constraints (Stein 1995; Genesove and Mayer 1997) or 
loss aversion (Genesove and Mayer 2001). Second, ARMs may allow 
potential buyers to beat further prospective rate increases, sustaining 
demand for a time after a monetary tightening.
26. For more on how changes in short-term interest rate persistence 
have affected long-term rates, see Watson (1999).
27. For example, see Ryding (1990a, b).
28. An early example is Alberts (1962). Fair (1972) reviews many of 
the early studies. Another important development in this literature is 
Kearl (1979). The error-correction framework within our model has 
also been used by DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994).
29. Because the growth of the real housing stock averages only about 
2.5 percent per year, assuming that the housing stock is given within a 
single period would appear to be innocuous for the quarterly data that 
we use. Our method for measuring the housing stock is described in 
Appendix A.156 Monetary Policy Transmission to Residential Investment 
Endnotes (Continued)
30. As in the VAR model, we use the repeat sales index from OFHEO 
to measure home prices.
31. See Appendix A for our definition and measurement of user cost.
32. For example, see Fair (1972), Rosen and Smith (1983), DiPasquale 
and Wheaton (1994), and Mayer and Somerville (2000). On the 
demand side, slow adjustment is characterized by lagged vacancy rates 
affecting prices, rents, and starts, which is not consistent with the 
simple model (see also McCarthy and Peach [2000]). On the supply 
side, slow adjustment is characterized by quantitative indicators of 
housing supply affecting housing investment, even after controlling 
for prices.
33. For example, see Rosen, Rosen, and Holtz-Eakin (1984).
34. Besides the substitution effect, the coefficient on tenant rent will be 
positive to the extent that high rent inflation today indicates higher 
rents tomorrow, which would increase the asset value of homes.
35. For example, see Topel and Rosen (1988), DiPasquale and 
Wheaton (1994), and Mayer and Somerville (2000).
36. Cointegration and the Johansen trace statistic are discussed 
extensively in Hamilton (1994).
37. Because the housing stock is assumed in the model to be fixed 
within a period, simultaneity problems usually associated when 
estimating a demand function do not apply here, and thus we estimate 
equation 3 using ordinary least squares.
38. For example, see Fair (1972), Rosen and Smith (1983), and, in 
particular, DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994).
39. The role of interest rates and user costs in empirical investment 
models typically is smaller and less immediate than that implied in 
theoretical models; for example, see Chirinko (1993).
40. In contrast to equation 3, simultaneity bias may be a problem in 
estimating equation 4. We cannot assume that home prices in the 
supply side are fixed within a period. We therefore estimate equation 4 
using the generalized method-of-moments, with the instruments 
identified in the notes to Table 3.References
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